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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TATES, INC., \ 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. I 
LITTLE AMERICA REFINING 
CO., A Corporation dba LITTLE 
AMERICA, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
13681 
Brief of Defendant-Respondent 
STATEMENT OF T H E CASE AND 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant submits that the plaintiff's Statement 
of the Case is not accurate beyond the first two sen-
tences. At the close of plaintiff's case, the defendant 
moved that the Court dismiss the action on the grounds 
that an accord and satisfaction had been established as 
pleaded in the defendant's second defense, and that as a 
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result the plaintiff's cause of action failed and the de-
fendant's counterclaim failed (R. 84 and 85). The court 
took the motion under advisement (R. 89, 1. 28). The 
plaintiff then offered some additional testimony (R. 90-
93). The defendant then renewed the motion to dismiss 
(R. 93, 1. 18) and the defendant proceeded, with the 
motion under advisement (R. 93, 1. 20). 
At the close of all the evidence and the arguments 
of counsel, the court ruled that there was an accord and 
satisfaction and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint and 
the defendant's counterclaim on defendant's original 
motion (R. 126). 
The Findings of Fact and Judgment set out the 
accord and satisfaction and the dismissal as ruled by the 
court (R. 5-9). 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
Defendant submits that the plaintiff seeks to re-
verse the decision of the lower court in finding an accord 
and satisfaction and that the result of such a reversal 
would of necessity be to remand the case to the District 
Court to determine whether, absent the accord and sat-
isfaction, the plaintiff made out a case, and in what 
amount, and to consider the evidence on the defendant's 
counterclaim and adjudicate the plaintiff's complaint 
and the defendant's counterclaim. 
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S T A T E M E N T OF F A C T S 
Defendant submits that the testimony offered by it 
is not properly before this Court, since the motion to 
dismiss as of the close of the plaintiff's case was granted 
by the lower court. 
Likewise, defendant will not respond to the por-
tions of plaintiff's brief which relate to plaintiff's ex-
pense on the loaner bus, the sufficiency of the delivery 
of the bus, or to Point I I I of plaintiff's brief which re-
lates to that portion of plaintiff's cause of action and is 
made irrelevant by the finding of an accord and satis-
faction. Defendant will not answer plaintiff's argument 
under Point I for the reason that whether there was a 
valid contract for the purchase of the bus is also made 
irrelevant under the court's finding and judgment that 
there was an accord and satisfaction in February 1973. 
DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant ordered a bus from plaintiff by letter of 
January 12, 1972, and purchase order of January 21, 
1972 (Ex. I P and 2P) , which contemplate delivery in 
approximately ninety days. The bus was delivered Jan-
uary 16, 1973, as shown by Exhibit 3P. In the interim, 
plaintiff supplied to defendant a loaner bus, which the 
plaintiff purchased for the purpose (R. 57). Plaintiff 
asked for a down payment on the bus and defendant de-
clined through September and October 1972 (R. 61) 
and made a deposit or down payment of $10,000 No-
3 
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vember 3, 1972 (R. 62), at which time the plaintiff, 
"advised Mr. Knight that you could assure him of de-
livery by the end of November and that's when he gave 
you the deposit of $10,000," (R. 62, lines 1-3), which 
was based upon what the factory had told Mr. Knaus, 
his testimony being: 
"My whole feeling about that is what the factory 
had told me and then I promised him." (R. 62 
lines 10-11) 
Following the delivery of the bus in January 1973, 
agents of the parties had a conversation (Mr. Knaus 
and Mr. Knight—R. 65) which was followed by the 
letter of February 12, 1973 (Ex. 6D). Exhibit 6D re-
fers to the original promised delivery date and that 
"As a result of the delay, we experienced much 
aggravation and considerable expense. 
"At the time we made a partial payment to you 
in October we were assured that delivery would 
be accomplished by the end of November. 
"From the end of November until delivery of the 
bus we experienced periods where the loaner bus 
was non-operable. These bills are attached for 
your information as follows: * * *" 
Bills totaling $3,407.26 are itemized and attached. This 
total is referred to in this manner: 
"Total to be deducted from invoice $3,407.26." 
On February 17, 1973, a check showing the deduc-
tion of $3,407.26 and the $10,000 down payment from 
the original price was mailed to the plaintiff with the 
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itemization of the dedeuctions and the down payment 
(Ex. 7D). 
Thereafter, Mr. Knaus called Mr. Knight of the 
defendant and thanked him for the check (R. 69, line 
2). About three weeks later Mr. Knaus and Mr. Urie 
called on Mr. Knight and told him that the deductions 
of $3,407.26 would not be allowed (R. 79, lines 3-5). 
Mr. Knight informed them that the defendant would 
not pay the amount (R. 82). 
A R G U M E N T 
T H E R E W A S AN ACCORD A N D SATISFAC-
TION. 
Defendant argued that if there was an accord and 
satisfaction, it should be recognized by the court which 
would result in dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint and 
the defendant's counterclaim without reference to who 
would benefit most by the accord and satisfaction as 
against their other claims (R. 84-86). Authorities were 
cited to the court and are contained at page 86 of the 
record, some of which are referred to hereafter. 
There was a dispute between the parties as to what 
was owing. Delivery of the bus had been long delayed, 
defendant had suffered many inconveniences, a definite 
promise of delivery date as of the end of November had 
been made (R. 62) and the defendant claimed the right 
to deduct expenses incurred after that date (November 
30, 1972) until the bus was finally received in January. 
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The defendant made clear its claim of offsets (Ex. 
6D and 7D and R. 69) and submitted a check in full 
payment after allowing the claimed offsets (Ex. 7D). 
One of the leading cases on the subject of accord 
and satisfaction is Stanley Thompson Liquor Co. v. 
Southern Colorado Merc. Co., 65 Colo. 587, 178 P . 577 
4 A.L.R, 471 (1919). In this case the court drew freely 
from other authorities and autlined the elements of ac-
cord and satisfaction as follows: 
"Where a claim is unliquidated or in dispute, 
payment and acceptance of a less sum than 
claimed, in satisfaction, operates as an accord and 
satisfaction." 178 P . 578. 
The court explained that it is essential that there be 
a disputed claim and that the creditor have notice that 
the payment is offered in full satisfaction of the claim. 
"When a claim is disputed or unliquidated and 
the tender of a check or draft in settlement there-
of is of such character as to give the creditor no-
tice that it must be accepted in full satisfaction of 
the claim or not at all, the retention and use 
thereof by the creditor constitutes an accord and 
satisfaction." Id. at 579. 
The court further explained that the notice to creditors 
can be accomplished by the proper endorsement on the 
check, by appropriate recitals on an accompanying 
voucher, or by attendant circumstances which would 
reasonably give notice to the creditor. 
The facts in the Stanley Thompson case are nearly 
identical to the present case. Defendant's letter (Ex-
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hibit 6-D) made very clear the fact that defendant's 
check (Exhibit 7-D) was offered in full satisfaction of 
the disputed claim and as the court in Stanley Thomp-
son said, where 
" . . . the check was received, endorsed and cashed, 
and the money obtained thereon was retained by 
the plaintiff . . . it must be held, therefore, that 
the check was accepted on the conditions on which 
it was offered, and that its acceptance constitutes 
an accord and satisfaction." Id. at 579. 
While the Stanley Thompson case is an older case, 
it has been extensively followed in numerous jurisdic-
tions, including: Montana, Sawyer v. Somers Lumber 
Co., 86 Mont. 169, 282 P. 852; New Mexico, Frazier v. 
Ray, 29 N.M. 121, 219 P . 429; Delaware, State v. 
Massachusetts Bonding § Ins. Co., 40 Dela. 274, 9 A.2d 
77; New York, Schnell v. Perlman, 238 N.Y. 362, 144 
N.E. 641, 34 A.L.R. 1023; and Vermont, Siwooganock 
Guaranty Savings Bank v. Cushman, 109 Vt. 221, 195 
A. 260. 
While this Court has recognized the doctrine of ac-
cord and satisfaction, Dillman v. Massey-F erguson, 
Inc., 13 Utah 2d 142, 369 P.2d 296 (1962) ; Cheney v. 
Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86 (1963), defend-
ant has not been able to find any Utah cases dealing 
with accord and satisfaction which are directly on point. 
However, two recent Idaho cases involve fact situations 
nearly identical to the present case. 
In Rush v. G-K Machinery Co., 84 Idaho 10, 367 
P.2d 280 (1961), the plaintiff brought an action for the 
7 
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balance on an account allegedly due growing out of a 
sale of heavy equipment. A dispute arose between plain-
tiff and defendant as to the price and the applicability 
of certain credits. The defendant sent a check which 
was accompanied by a letter making it clear that the 
check was being tendered in full settlement. After re-
viewing the elements, the Court had no difficulty in 
finding an accord and satisfaction. The Court indicated 
that the law is clear: 
"The creditor to whom a check is sent or other 
remittance made as payment in full has the op-
tion either of accepting it on the conditions on 
which it is sent, or of rejecting it. When a claim 
is in dispute, and the debtor sends to his creditor 
a check or other remittance which he clearly 
states is in full payment of the claim, and the 
creditor accepts the remittance or collects the 
check without objection, it is generally recog-
nized that this constitutes a good accord and sat-
isfaction." 367 P.2d 284. 
A second recent Idaho case, Nordling v. Whelchel 
Mines Co., 90 Idaho 213, 409 P.2d 398 (1965), involved 
a dispute over the applicability of a $133 offset against 
rental payments on some mining equipment. The de-
fendant sent a check accompanied by a letter explaining 
that the check was tendered as payment in full. The 
Court emphatically stated that upon cashing the check, 
the doctrine of accord and satisfaction cut off any fur-
ther claims of the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff relies heavily on Dillman v. Massey-Fer-
guson, Inc., supra. In Dillman this Court recognized 
8 
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the doctrine of accord and satisfaction but refused to 
apply it to the facts of that particular case. In Dillman 
the parties had a contract concerning the buy-back of 
goods and the payment of bonuses. The parties agreed 
that certain goods qualified for treatment under the 
buy-back provisions, but disagreed concerning other 
goods and the bonuses. A check was tendered, as pay-
ment in full, for the items agreed upon. This Court 
properly ruled that the acceptance of the payment on 
the agreed goods did not constitute an accord and satis-
faction on the unagreed goods and bonuses. This Court 
recognized that the agreement was divisible and certain 
claims were liquidated while other claims were unliqui-
dated. Paying the liquidated claims in full in no way 
affected the unliquidated or disputed claims. This Court 
wrote at 13 Utah 2d 144: 
"The dispute as to what appellant had agreed to 
buy back was not related to the payment made 
for items actually bought back. There was no dis-
pute as to the amount due for those items and, 
therefore, it cannot be contended that the cash-
ing of the check paying for such items constituted 
an accord and satisfaction of a dispute as to 
whether appellant has breached an agreement to 
buy back other items it had rejected . . ." 
The Dillman case has no application to the present 
case. I t might conceivably apply if defendant had 
agreed to buy two or more buses and the dispute arose 
over the amount due for one particular bus when pay-
ment in full for another bus had been tendered. How-
ever, the facts of the present case are much different. 
9 
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W e have an unliquidated, disputed claim to which the 
doctrine of accord and satisfaction properly applies. 
Plaintiff also relies on Nevada Half Moon Mining 
Co. v. Combined Metals Reduction Co., 176 F.2d 73 
(10th Cir. 1949). While this case is somewhat helpful, 
in that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the 
elements of accord and satisfaction, the facts are very 
different. 
The defendant had a contract to pay the plaintiff a 
mineral royalty. Subsequent to the execution of the con-
tract, the Office of Price Administration placed a ceiling 
on the price of certain minerals. Shortly thereafter, the 
United States Government established the Metals Re-
serve Company through which subsidy payments were 
made to encourage the production of certain minerals. 
A dispute arose between the plaintiff and the de-
fendant as to how the royalties should be determined. 
The defendant took the position that the royalties should 
be based solely on mill returns under the O P A schedule, 
while the plaintiff argued that they ought to be based 
on the mill returns plus the subsidy payments. 
A total of 57 royalty payments were made. All of 
the 57 royalty payments were made by check with a 
voucher attached showing that the royalty was based 
solely on the mill returns. The defendant argued that 
this was evidence of an accord and satisfaction. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to 
find an accord and satisfaction. The Court noted that 
10 
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the 57 royalty payments spanned a considerable length 
of time and that some payments were made before the 
establishment of the subsidy payments (and, therefore, 
before the resulting controversy between plaintiff and 
defendant) and some payments were made after. Yet, 
as the Court pointed out: 
"The checks, vouchers and settlement sheets 
which combined delivered to Nevada were in the 
same form both before and after the controversy 
arose respecting the payment of the royalty on 
the sums received from Metals Reserve Com-
pany. There was no change in them." 176 F.2d 
76. 
The Court went on to hold that the plaintiff was thus 
never given notice that the payments were in settlement 
of the dispute and, therefore, there could be no accord 
and satisfaction. 
The facts of the present case do not even begin to 
approach the Tenth Circuit case where the real issue 
was one of notice. There, the plaintiff and defendant 
were involved in a lengthy series of installment pay-
ments, while here we have but one isolated transaction 
between plaintiff and defendant. There, the Court 
found that the plaintiff could not reasonably be expect-
ed to be put on notice when the payment pattern set 
prior to the dispute was followed in an identical manner 
after the dispute arose. Here, the defendant's letter 
(Exhibit 6-D) and defendant's check (Exhibit 7-D), 
together with the attendant circumstances, could rea-
sonably be expected to give plaintiff notice, and the 
Court below so held. 
11 
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Plaintiff accepted and cashed the check. When the 
factory refused to cover plaintiff's resultant shrinkage, 
the plaintiff, having eaten his cake, wanted the Court to 
rule that it still had it. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence showed a bona fide dispute as to what 
was owing, a check tendered as full payment after mak-
ing certain claimed deductions or offsets, notice to the 
plaintiff of the claim, acceptance of the check, with 
thanks, and a later change of heart. The District Court 
soundly ruled there was an accord and satisfaction. This 
Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R I C H A R D S , B I R D & K U M P 
By R I C H A R D L. B I R D , J R . 
G R E G O R Y L. S E A L 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
